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UNITED STATES v. DADDANO: A PROCEDURE
FOR PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The difficulty faced by a trial court in preserving the
integrity of a proceeding before it without curtailing either
the right of the news media to provide full coverage of the proceeding or the legitimate public interest in the details of what
transpires before the court, as well as peripheral and background
information concerning the proceeding and parties involved, is
the problem which has come to be designated by the phrase,
"free press - fair trial."1 The gravamen of the problem is
this. Freedom of the press is protected specifically by the United
States Constitution.2 The Constitution further guarantees to
every defendant in a criminal proceeding the right to a public
trial,' and the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
secrecy of judicial proceedings is repugnant to the concept of
justice which prevails in the United States.4 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has asserted with equal force the proposition
that the Constitutional guarantee that no one shall be deprived
of his life, his liberty or his property without due process of
law" requires that judicial proceedings be free from outside influence, and that a jury's verdict must be based solely upon the
evidence and testimony adduced at the trial' and not upon information received from external sources.8
The practical aspects of the problem are brought into focus
more clearly upon consideration of the dilemma faced by the
trial judge. He must protect the Constitutional right of the
defendant in the proceeding before him to a trial by an impartial
jury, as well as the public interest in the integrity of the judicial
system.9 To accomplish this, he must insure to the best of his
I An apt statement of the problem is provided by Mr. Justice Black in
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). "For free speech and fair trials
are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a
trying task to choose between them." Id. at 260.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
aU.S. CONST. amend. VI.

"Inre Oliver, 833 U.S. 257, 270 (1947).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 833, 362 (1966).

7 In Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Supreme Court
raised the proposition that "[tihe very word 'trial' connotes decisions on the
evidence and arguments properly advanced in open court." Id. at 271.
8 Id. at 271; Patterson v. Colorado 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1906).
9 In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 831 (1945), the Supreme Court
recognized the extent of the interest of the public at large in the integrity
of the judicial system:
The safety of society and the security of the innocent alike depend upon
wise and impartial criminal justice. Misuse of its machinery may
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ability that the jurors will not be exposed to any news media
containing information concerning the trial or parties involved.' 0
Simultaneously, he must use the powers" available to him for
controlling the propagation of potentially prejudicial news items
in such a way that neither the Constitutional right of the news
media to publish freely nor the public interest in unhampered
12
availability of information is abridged.
Three courses of action are available to the trial judge in
this situation. First, he may exercise his general contempt
powers" to prevent the dissemination to and by the news media
of any items which go beyond the record of the proceeding. 1" In
practice, this solution is of limited effectiveness due to the difficulty of applying it without violating the Constitutional rights
guaranteed the news media 1 and due to the fact that citation
for contempt does not operate to prevent the actual dissemination of the proscribed articles, but only to punish the offending
party after the fact. Second, he may, without attempting to limit
the items reported by the news media, prevent their exposure
to the jury by ordering the jurors sequestered during the trial.'8
While sequestration of the jury is an effective solution to the
problem, especially where the adverse publicity is expected to be
severe, 17 many courts have felt that it imposes a hardship upon
the jurors and should be used only where the situation is ex-

treme. 18

In addition, defense counsel in several cases have

undermine the safety of the State; its misuse may deprive the individual
of all that makes a free man's life dear.
Id. at 357.
10 The particular objection to prejudicial items reaching the jury through
news media is that such items are not subject to the procedural safeguards
which can be applied to prejudicial items which might arise during the proceeding as part of the prosecution's case. Marshall v. United States, 360
U.S. 310 313 (1959).
11 Te broadest power available to the trial judge in this situation is
the citation for contempt, by which theoretically he can enjoin the parties
to the proceeding from making disclosures to news media or public statements and can prevent the publication of items which go beyond the record.
18 U.S.C. §401 (1958).
However, the Supreme Court has made it clear
that the use of such power, at least in regard to news media is not favored.
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 373 (1946); Pennekamp v. Florida 328 U.S.
331, 347 (1945); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (19415.
For a
discussion of other methods available for controlling the spread of prejudicial
news coverage, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-63 (1966).
12 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
13 Note 11 supra.
1" Publication of the record is not objectionable because "[w] hat transpires in the court room is public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
374 (1947).
"5 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-63 (1941). See also Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946); Pennekaip v. Florida 328 U.S. 331 (1945);
People v. Gross, 10 Ill. 2d 533, 141 N.E.2d385 (19575, reargued, 20 Ill. 2d
224, 170 N.E.2d 113 (1960).
16 Whether the jury should be confined rests within the sound discretion
of the trial judge. Koolish v. United States, 340 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1965).
"7 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
18 Koolish v. United States, 340 F.2d 513, 528 (8th Cir. 1965). See also
Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1942).
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opposed sequestration of the jury on the grounds that the inconvenience caused the jurors will create a bias against the defendant. 19 Third, the judge may, without limiting the items which
may be reported by the news media, attempt to limit the effect
of such items upon the proceeding by admonishing the jurors
not to allow themselves to be exposed to such items, even though
they are physically free to do so, and by taking steps during the
proceeding to determine the degree of compliance with his ad20
monitions.
The case of United States v. Daddano,2 1 recently decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
provides clarification of the procedure to be followed by trial
judges in the Seventh Circuit in cases where the judge chooses
to adopt this third course of action. Specifically, Daddano
demonstrates the steps which the trial judge must take to safeguard the rights of the defendant in a criminal proceeding where
the jury is not sequestered and no attempt has been made to
restrain news media. The significance of Daddano is not that
it represents a change in the law, but that it demonstrates the
application of the comprehensive rule established in the earlier
22
case of Margoles v. United States.
In the Daddano case, the defendants were charged with
conspiracy to commit bank robbery, bank robbery and misprison
of a felony2 3 A trial before a jury in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
resulted in the defendants being convicted of all charges in the
indictment, and they appealed, contending that the measures
taken by the trial judge to prevent the jury from being prejudiced
by various news items which appeared during the trial were
inadequate and not in accord with the established procedure
24
in the Seventh Circuit.
The jury was not sequestered during the trial, which lasted
approximately three weeks. At the beginning of the first day
of voir dire, the judge admonished the prospective jurors that
they must decide the case only upon the evidence presented in
19 United States v. Palermo, 410 F.2d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1969) ; United

States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 1963).
20

Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 1969).

21432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970).
22 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
23 Count 1 of the indictment charged the defendants Daddano, Montagna,
Cain and Varelli with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. §3 and §4 in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §371 (1958). Count 2 charged the defendants Frank DeLegge,
Sr. and Frank DeLegge, Jr. with bank robbery with the use of dangerous
weapons in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113 (a) (d) (1958). Count 3 charged
the defendants Daddano, Montagna and Cain with violation of 18 U.S.C. §3
(1958), and Count 4 charged the defendants Daddano, Montagna, Cain and
Varelli with violation of 18 U.S.C. §4 (1958).
24 United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
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open court, that they must not discuss the case and that they
should avoid exposure to news reports concerning it. 25

This

admonition was repeated before each recess, so that on the 15
days on which jurors were present, the order was given 46 times.
During the course of the trial, articles concerning it appeared
in four Chicago papers. For the most part, these articles,
several of which were on the front page and one of which included a full width headline, contained a record of the proceeding
as it progressed. However, some stories did appear which imputed various underworld ties to the defendants and discussed
other criminal activity with which the defendants allegedly
were connected. Also appearing was a story which carried the
implication that some of the defendants were responsible for
2 6
the murder of an associate who had cooperated with police
and a story in which a prosecution witness expressed the belief
that his life was in jeopardy because of his role in the proceeding.
At various times throughout the trial, defense counsel
brought newspaper stories to the court's attention and requested
that the judge poll the jurors to determine whether any had
read them and, if any juror responded affirmatively, whether
2
he had been prejudicedY.

Each time, the judge declined to

comply with the request, calling attention to his frequent admonitions28 and stating that he was relying upon the presumption
that his orders were being followed.
In affirming the convictions, the court of appeals held
that the failure of the trial judge to examine the jurors regarding
specific items as requested by defense
counsel did not deprive
29
the defendants of an impartial jury.
Viewing the special facts of the instant case, tried before our
pronouncement in Margoles, we think the trial judge could reasonably presume that jurors followed the orders so carefully and
The exact content of the admonition is not reported.
Evidence presented during the'trial indicated that, at some point
after the commission of the robbery, the suspicion arose among the partici25

26

pants that one of them had informed the police. The defendant Daddano
then decided that all should take lie detector tests concerning the matter, and
that if aiyone failed the test, the others could shoot him if they wished.
Pursuant to this plan, the defendants Daddano and Montagna arranged with
the defendant Cain, who was then Chief of the Special Investigations Unit
of the office of the Cook County SHeriff to have the tests administered by an
investigator from that office. The news stories which appeared during the
trial implied that Guy Mendola, a participant in the robbery who was deceased at the time of the trial, had been shot because he failed to pass the
lie detector test. The implication of Cain imparted to the proceeding a news
value which it would not otherwise have had due to the fact that Richard
Ogilvie, who was Cook County Sheriff at the time the events occurred was
running for governor, and the involvement of his staff member with the
other defendants in the proceeding became a campaign issue.
27 The procedure requested was that established in United States v.
Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
28

29

Note 25 supra.
432 F.2d 1119, 1128 (7th Cir. 1970).
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frequently given, and that they neither intentionally
read the
30
stories nor had prejudicial material forced upon them.
The "special facts" upon which the court of appeals based
its decision were the admonition given by the trial judge and
the nature of the adverse publicity.3 1 The admonition was
explicit in forbidding exposure to news media of any kind3 2 and
was given prior to every occasion that the jurors were allowed
to separate. The publicity, while clearly prejudicial, 33 was
neither so sensational nor so frequent as to force itself upon
anyone making a reasonable effort to avoid exposure to it.8'
On the basis of these special facts, the court distinguished
the situation in Daddano from that in United States v. Accardo.ss
In Accardo, the trial lasted for approximately eight weeks, and
the jury was allowed to separate each night. Front page headlines carried prejudicial material, and the trial judge admonished
the jurors regarding exposure to adverse publicity only once,
6
As in Daddano, the
at the opening of the first day of voir dire."
trial judge declined to poll the jury when prejudicial items were
brought to his attentionY In reversing the convictions, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:
In view of . . . defendant's publicity value, it was essential
that the judge frequently, prior to separation, call the attention
of the jurors specifically to the possibility of newspaper accounts
carrying statements of fact about the case ....
His general inquiry during the voir dire examination did not
supply the deficiency. He should have, by the careful examination
of each juror out of the presence of the others, determined the
effect of the articles on those who had read them and whether they
had discussed the articles with others .... 31
The decision in Accardo appeared to require this particular
procedure whenever the possibility of jurors being exposed to
prejudicial publicity was brought to the trial judge's attention. 9
However, the court of appeals recognized that each case must
turn on its own facts, 4 0 and a series of subsequent decisions confirmed that the procedure laid out in Accardo was not required
4
in all situations. 1
0 ld. at 1128.
31 Id.
32

Id. at 1126-27.

33Id. at 1127.
34 Id. at 1128.

35298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962).
36 Id. at 135.
37 Id. at 136.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40

Id.

United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968) (Frequent
admonitions; no juror admitted having seen any prejudicial items); United
States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1965) (Overwhelming proof of
defendant's guilt); United States v. Jannsen, 339 F.2d 916 (7th Cir, 1964)
41
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In Margoles v. United States,4 2 a decision rendered subsequent to the trial in Daddano, but prior to the decision on appeal,
the court of appeals announced a revised procedure, based upon
the earlier decision in Aecardo.4 3 The rule of Margoles was not
controlling in the decision of Daddano, as the court had previously held in United States v. Solomon 4 that the procedure
established in the Margoles case would be applied prospectively
only. 45 However, both in Solomon4 and in Daddano'4 the court
affirmed the proposition that the rule of Margoles should apply
to all trials commenced after March 4, 1969, the date of its
decision.
The Margoles case established a comprehensive statement of
the procedure to be followed by trial judges in proceedings begun
after the date of that decision.
Thus, the procedure required by this Circuit where prejudicial
publicity is brought to the court's attention during a trial is that
the court must ascertain if any jurors who had been exposed to such
publicity had read or heard the same. Such jurors who respond
affirmatively must then be examined, individually and outside the
presence of the other jurors, to determine the effect of the publicity.
However, if no juror indicates, upon inquiry made to the jury
collectively, that he has read or heard any of the48publicity in question, the judge is not required to proceed further.
That part of the rule which establishes the procedure to
be followed in the event of an affirmative response by one or
more jurors is dictum, inasmuch as no juror responded affirmatively in Margoles. The earlier decision in Accardo also contained language to the effect that interrogation of jurors who
indicate exposure to prejudicial material should occur out of
the presence of other jurors.4 9 However, in subsequent decisions,'5 the court treated this language as establishing a recommended, but not required, procedure due to the fact that, of the
two judges voting for reversal, only Judge Kiley would have
made the procedure required,51 while Judge Duffy in his concurring opinion considered it to be optional.52 Despite this, the
language used in describing the development of the rule in
(Publicity not prejudicial as a matter of law) ; United States v. Micele,
327 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1964) (Publicity concerned defendant's brother).
42,407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1969).
4'Id. at 735.
44422 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1970).
45
46

Id. at 1117.
Id.

47 432 F.2d 1119, 1127-28 (7th Cir. 1970).
48

407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969).

49 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
50 United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir. 1970) ; United

States v. Largo, 346 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Jannsen,

839 F.2d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1964).

5 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
52 Id. at 140,
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Margoles indicates that the court now considers the separate
interrogation of jurors to be required."
During the course of the trial in Margoles, the judge
"strongly and repeatedly admonished the jury . . . not to read or
listen to any news coverage of the case and not to discuss it with
anyone. ' 54 Although there is language in Margoles and in the
later case of United States v. Solomon 55 which indicates that
the trial judge is not required to give such an admonition unless
requested by counsel,5 6 the court of appeals expressed the opinion
that the overall approach to determining which safeguards
must be employed in a situation involving possible exposure
to prejudicial publicity is that "[t]he nature of the measures
taken by the trial court should . . . depend upon the severity
of the threat to the integrity of the trial. 15 7 From this, it is
fairly certain that implicit in the comprehensive procedure to
be followed in the event that prejudicial material is brought
to the court's attention is the assumption that the judge will
have been giving a frequent and explicit admonition throughout
the course of the trial. The frequency is not specified in Margoles, but at least once daily, prior to the jurors separating seems
to be preferred.,, In extreme cases, more than once per day may
be desirable5 9 That the admonition must specifically enjoin
exposure to news items is well established.60
As the foregoing indicates, the full procedure required in
the Seventh Circuit to safeguard the rights of the defendant in
the situation where the jurors are not sequestered, and prejudicial publicity threatens the integrity of the proceeding, requires
three things. The first of these is a frequent and explicit admonition not to read or listen to any news items concerning the
trial or any of the persons involved, given throughout the proceeding. The second is a poll of the jurors upon each occasion
during the trial that the existence of prejudicial publicity is
brought to the court's attention.6- The poll, which may be made
either collectively or individually, is to determine whether any
juror has read or heard the item in question. If no juror answers
affirmatively, the procedure need not go beyond this point. The
s 407 F.2d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 733.
55 422 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1970).
56 407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1969).
67
Id.
58United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1970) ; United
States v. Micele, 327 F.2d 222, 226 (7th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Accardo,
298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
59 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966).
60 United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
61 The procedure established in Margoles v. United States apparently
applies only to the situation in which the existence of prejudicial news items
is brought to the court's attention by counsel, and the court is under no duty
to initiate the procedure sua sponte. 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
84
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third requirement is an interrogation of each juror who responds
to the poll in the affirmative. The judge must individually interrogate each juror so answering out of the presence of the others
to determine whether exposure to the prejudicial item has
affected that juror's ability to remain impartial.
Although not referred to in the comprehensive rule stated
in Margoles, the court continued to acknowledge the role of
"special facts," primarily as a corollary to their statement that
the nature of the measures taken by the trial court to protect
the defendant's rights should be proportionate to the severity
of the threat to the integrity of the trial.62 Recent decisions
indicate that the procedures outlined, in Margoles are the
minimum safeguards which will be tolerated,86 and at least one
decision indicates that situations may arise in which the special
facts are such that the trial judge should declare a mistrial
despite compliance with the procedure established in Margoles.
In Marshall v. United States,64 the Supreme Court held that
where some jurors admitted having seen newspaper articles
which recounted the defendant's two prior convictions, the trial
judge should have declared a mistrial even though he had interrogated separately each juror who admitted having read the article
and had concluded that there was no prejudice to the defendant.65
The procedure established by Margoles requires that the
trial judge interrogate each juror who responds that he or she
has read or heard the news item under consideration to determine
whether that juror has been so influenced by exposure to the
prejudicial item as no longer to be impartial.66 Margoles does
not, however, establish any standard by which the partiality
of a juror may be judged.
The Supreme Court has established the principle that a
trial judge has wide discretion in ruling on the impartiality of
a juror.6 7 However, as the decision in Marshall indicates, this
discretion is not without limits. In Reynolds v. United States,8i
the Court established that the precise issue to be determined
is that of "whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed
are such as in law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality."69 Continuing, the Court said, "[t] he question thus
62

407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1969).

68 See United States v. Palermo, ,410 F.2d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1969).

84360 U.S. 310 (1959).
Neither the opinion of the Supreme Court' nor that of :the Court of
Appeals, reported in 258 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1958), indicates whether the trial
85

judge had admonished the jury concerning exposure to news items. While
the absence of an admonition could have constituted "special facts" sufficient
for reversal, neither court discussed the point.
66 407F*2d 727; 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
67 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910).
68 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
69 Id. at 156.
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presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, as far
as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character,
upon the evidence." 70 Therefore, a mistrial need not be declared
unless evidence shows that the juror had formed such an opinion
that he could not be deemed impartial as a matter of law.
When the judge is required to interrogate a juror as to his
impartiality, the juror's own testimony regarding his state of
mind is the primary evidence upon which the judge will be
required to decide the question. However, the mere expression by
a juror that he has formed an opinion may not be sufficient to
find that he is no longer impartial if his manner while responding
indicates otherwise. 7 1 Thus, the demeanor of the juror while
responding is to be considered along with the substance of his
answer.
The situations in which a juror must be declared no longer
impartial as a matter of law are not clearly defined. In Marshall,
the Supreme Court held that where jurors were exposed to a
newspaper article revealing defendant's two prior convictions,
information which had previously been ruled inadmissible as
evidence, the trial judge should have considered them prejudiced
as a matter of law, despite the representations of the individual
jurors that they could still reach an impartial verdict.7 2 Another
situation in which partiality was deemed to exist as a matter of
law was in Sheppard v. Maxwell,7 3 where the publicity to which
the jurors were exposed was particularly inflammatory.7 '
While there is no settled rule, a distinction between those
cases in which the prejudicial publicity has consisted of representations of fact, true or untrue, and those in which it has
consisted of editorial opinion generally unfavorable to the defendant may be of significance. Thus, as in Marshall, where
the news items to which the jurors are exposed contain representations of fact which have been ruled inadmissible as evidence
or which would be ruled inadmissible were an attempt made to
introduce them, the judge may be required to declare a mistrial
in spite of the responses of the jurors who have been exposed to
the material. In a case where the prejudicial items do not contain
representations of fact, but consist only of an editorial opinion,
a reasonable reliance upon the representations of the jurors may
be possible.
70

1d.
71 Reynolds

v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878).
72360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
73 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
74 The opinion of Mr. Justice Clark reports the "more flagrant episodes"
of prejudicial publicity which arose during the trial of Dr. Sheppard. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 345-49 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
5
In Margoles v. United States7
the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit developed a comprehensive procedure to be
followed by trial judges in the Seventh Circuit in criminal proceedings where the jury is not sequestered, and prejudicial news
coverage threatens the integrity of the proceeding. The application of this procedure, mandatory in all proceedings commenced
after March 4, 1969,7 is demonstrated in the subsequent case of
United States v. Daddano.71 The procedure established by
Margoles is that where prejudicial publicity is brought to the
court's attention during a trial, the court must ascertain if any
jurors who had been exposed to the publicity had read or heard
it. Such jurors who respond affirmatively must then be examined, individually and outside the presence of the other jurors,
to determine the effect of the publicity."8 While not expressly
required by Margoles, implicit in that case, as well as in Daddano,
is the assumption that during the trial, the judge will admonish
the jurors to avoid exposure to news coverage of the proceeding,
and that the function of the procedure established in Margoles
is to determine the degree of compliance with such admonition.7 9

Recent decisions indicate that the procedure outlined in
Margoles is the minimum safeguard which will be tolerated in a
case where the possibility of exposure to prejudicial publicity
exists, 80 and some situations may arise in which this procedure
will be insufficient to protect the rights of the defendant. 8 In
such a situation, tainting of the proceeding is presumed as a
matter of law, and a mistrial must be declared, regardless of
the representations of individual jurors that they are still capable
of rendering an impartial verdict.82 At present, no clear-cut
rule for distinguishing those situations in which the procedure
outlined in Margoles will be sufficient from those in which it
will not has emerged.
JordanPeters

407 F.2d (7th Cir. 1969).
United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110, 1117 (7th Cir. 1970).
432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970).
78 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
79 United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1128 (7th Cir. 1970);
Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 1969).
80
Note 63 supra.
81
See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
82 Id. at 312.
75
76
1

